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ABSTRACT
This analysis examines the perceived lag in the pol-
icy process with respect to risk assessment and risk
management in relationship to the development of new
technologies that have the potential to create new threats
to public health and safety. Hydraulic fracturing and
the ongoing revolution in natural gas exploration make
an excellent case study of the difficulties that inevitably
arise, are difficult to resolve, and that expand threats to
public health and safety when policy makers do not pri-
oritize risk assessment and risk management until the
negative impacts or potential harms of previous deci-
sions are felt. The analysis begins with a description of
the hydraulic fracturing revolution and a discussion of
the potential risks associated with it. This will include
some of the preliminary scientific work on the subject.
The analysis will highlight concerns that timely assess-
ment and management of these risks is often frustrated
by the policy process itself. In essence, the conclusion
reached is that significant improvements in the timely
assessing and managing the risks associated with tech-
nological advances require policy makers to emulate the
emergency management profession in elevating risk
assessment and risk management to the level of a first
priority in the policy process.
Key words: hydraulic fracturing, risk assessment,
risk management
INTRODUCTION
Hydraulic fracturing or hydrofracking (ie, the
fracturing of rocks far beneath the earth’s surface for
the recovery of natural gas) has generated both
staunch support and significant criticism. Supporters
have applauded the new technologies that have
opened up new potential for the exploration for natu-
ral gas. They have praised natural gas as the cheap,
clean, and abundant fuel for the future. Some critics
have suggested that the new technologies for the
drilling of natural gas will have large and undesirable
environmental effects and pose significant risks to
public health.1 New natural gas discoveries suggest
that the United States is awash with reserves that can
be used to substitute for coal in power plants, serve as
a bridge to a low carbon future, and provide a transi-
tion fuel in the ongoing battle against climate change.
However, concerns about the possible risks associated
with hydraulic fracturing (fracking) have escalated as
this method of natural gas extraction has become
more commonplace and its effects have been debated.
The purpose of this analysis is to examine the phe-
nomenon of risk assessment in relation to hydraulic
fracturing as a case study that demonstrates some of
the inefficiencies built into the policy process with
respect to risk assessment and risk management in
relation to new technologies. It is often the case with
the development of new technologies that the assess-
ment and management of risks associated with them
tends to lag behind the innovations that may create
new threats to public health and safety. This is a func-
tion of the policy process itself. As an unfortunate by-
product, the possibility for risk management is fre-
quently delayed. This is, it shall be suggested, a
problem that should be a special concern with respect to
the development and implementation of new technolo-
gies that, in addition to providing benefits, may impose
new risks and harms associated with public health and
safety. It is likewise contended that, as the public policy
discussion surrounding new technologies and their
impacts inevitably expands over time, the need for both
the assessment and the management of risk does
inevitably ascend to a higher level priority on the policy
agenda. The question is whether this pivoting toward
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risk assessment comes in a timely (ie, most efficient)
manner to protect public health and safety. This is a
question that should be of considerable importance to
emergency management professionals.
Although emergency management practitioners
tend to be focused on the technical and immediate
aspects of their work and are somewhat reluctant to get
caught up in broader policy discussions, they nonethe-
less will have to prepare for, adapt to, and cope with the
effects of decisions by policy makers that may increase
some risks they will ultimately be expected to help
manage or respond to in their communities. In relation
to hydraulic fracturing and the assessment of any risks
associated with it (as with any other potential for
industrial disasters in the communities it serves), the
emergency management profession must be more than
an interested observer of the policy discussion. It should
see itself as a stakeholder with a significant vested
interest. Likewise, and perhaps more importantly, as
governmental entities at all levels (national, state, and
local) study and debate the merits of hydraulic fractur-
ing and the potential risks associated with it, informed
input from an emergency management perspective
would be of practical value to decision makers. Policy
makers have often needed a nudge to engage the con-
cerns that are critical to emergency management.
The early literature in the field of emergency
management demonstrated that disaster preparation
in general and hazard mitigation in particular were
of low salience to policy makers and the public
alike.2,3 In fact, the literature often noted indifference
or outright opposition to disaster preparedness.4
Public policy makers and officials were often des-
cribed as uninvolved or disinterested.5 Until a disas-
ter was on them and required immediate response,
policy makers (and the public) were just not that
interested. They were certainly not prepared to focus
on the issues of disaster preparation or mitigation. As
the 1990s progressed, this situation improved consid-
erably as the rising costs of natural disasters and fed-
eral leadership over that decade combined to produce
a more proactive approach to disaster planning and
mitigation. It became obvious over time that there
was a necessary connection of disaster planning and
mitigation to development strategies and community
resilience in the face of various natural and human-
caused threats.6,7 However, it remains an important
question whether this progress has carried over to
include a timely assessment and management of the
risks or disaster potentials associated with new tech-
nologies.
Historically, it is accurate to say that both corporate
leaders and public policy makers are too quick to take
the position of minimizing the risks attached to promis-
ing new technologies and practices.8 They tend to over-
look or underestimate long-term risks in the pursuit of
immediate economic and political benefits and values.
Although the research on the risks associated with
hydraulic fracturing is in its infancy, relatively speak-
ing, it is beginning to raise some very important con-
cerns that natural gas producers and politicians have
been slow to engage. The concerns raised are pretty
basic and straight forward to emergency management
professionals, public health officials, and scientific
researchers. This case study will highlight these con-
cerns and assess the need for responsible analysis and
timely policy with respect to them. After discussing the
technological revolution in natural gas exploration, we
shall examine the potential risks to be assessed and
managed, including some of the preliminary scientific
work on the subject. We shall see how this work has
begun to influence the policy process and is pivoting it,
inevitably if belatedly, toward the necessity of risk
assessment and risk management. We will conclude
this analytical case study with some recommendations
concerning the perceived need for improvement in the
timely assessment and management of the risks associ-
ated with technological advances.
AN ENERGY REVOLUTION AND A POLICY CHALLENGE
Risk assessment identifies, quantifies, and meas-
ures risks and vulnerabilities. Conversely, risk manage-
ment consists of the evaluation and application of risk
mitigation options.9 Risk assessment and risk manage-
ment techniques have become refined and have been
routinely applied to the planning for natural, indus-
trial, and national security crises or disasters. As we
examine the recent boom in hydraulic fracturing and
the politics surrounding it, we will see, however, that
the politics of the policy process often works against
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both timely risk analysis and the public interest in
health and safety.
At present, natural gas provides about 22 percent
of the energy in the United States and about 26 per-
cent worldwide.1 In addition to conventional sources
of natural gas, unconventional sources (ie, ocean
deposits of methane hydrates, coal-bed methane, and
shale gas deposits) may be able to provide larger
amounts of fuels than previously thought. These
unconventional sources, targets made ever more
exploitable by new technology, are understandably
inviting to energy producers. In July 2009, the US
Department of Energy announced that estimated US
gas reserves were 35 percent larger than previously
estimated.1 Much of this abundance can be attributed
to the new possibilities for tapping into unconven-
tional sources. Together these unconventional sources
may provide as much as 60 percent of all natural gas
in the United States by 2035. This suggests that they
will be prime targets for the accelerated application of
new technology. Presently, the most inviting target
would appear to be shale gas deposits.
Shale is one of the most common kinds of rock in
the United States (found in 23 states) and, with recent
technological developments, holds particularly great
potential for natural gas exploration. Presently, shale
gas deposits provide about 25 percent of the natural
gas in the United States but, with both the abundant
supply and new hydraulic fracturing technology, are
expected to provide 45 percent by 2035.10 This trend
will be accentuated by the popularity of natural gas as
a supposedly clean and affordable energy alternative.
All of this has spurred a rapid development of the
large deposits of shale gasses in the United States. It
is accurate to say that what has resulted might be
called a revolution in natural gas exploration.11
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, shale
gas production has exploded. There has been a rapid,
and relatively unregulated, expansion of shale gas
production in the United States. It began in Texas (the
Barnett Shale Field) in 2000 and has led to a race to
leverage immense shale deposits around the country.
The two best known deposits may be the Hainesville
Shale in Louisiana and the Marcellus Shale that
stretches from West Virginia through Pennsylvania and
New York. US shale gas production jumped from almost
zero to about two trillion cubic feet between 2000 and
2008.11 As the boom in shale gas exploration took off,
the conversation about the new horizontal fracturing
(ie, fracking) technology and any potential risks it may
pose to public health and safety has lagged behind as
natural gas producers, public policy makers, and media
were all relatively silent on the topic over much of the
decade.
Hydraulic fracturing or fracking is a drilling tech-
nique that involves pumping large volumes of water,
sand, and chemicals into deep shale deposits. This is
done to fracture the rocks and release the oil or gas.
Although some drillers have been fracking since the
1950s, the last decade has seen advancements in tech-
nology that have taken this drilling technique to new
levels.10 The major technological advancement has
been related to new horizontal drilling techniques
that have enabled producers to extract gas from
deposits that used to be inaccessible. Fracking had
been used in vertical wells for some time, but it did not
retrieve enough shale gas at economic levels. As
drilling advanced to where drillers were able to frack
horizontally, it broadened greatly the potential for
extraction from a single well and improved its prof-
itability in no small measure.10 Both popular and prof-
itable, this new technique of natural gas exploration is
not without some potential risks to the human and
animal populations.
It may take up to 8 million gallons of water mixed
with sand and fracturing fluids (ie, chemicals) to frack
a well. A well may be fracked up to 18 times.10 As we
have already noted, this is done to fracture the rocks
and release the oil or gas. With each fracking treat-
ment, about half of the fracking liquid returns to the
surface with the gas (via collection pipes) and about
half remains in the ground. The retrieved gas is piped
to compressor stations, purified, and compressed for
transport. The returning fracking fluids, now called
wastewater, are handled in a variety of ways. They
may be transported to water treatment plants (most of
which are not really designed to handle or treat frack-
ing fluids), may be stored in large tarp-lined pits and
be allowed to evaporate, or may be reinjected into old
wells.10 As one might expect, the fracking fluids are a
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primary source of concern. This is because of their
chemical composition, concerns about their usage and
disposal, the potential risk of polluting water tables
needed for drinking water and agricultural use, and
other potential public health related impacts.
Many fracking fluids can be toxic to humans and
wildlife. This includes chemicals known to cause can-
cer. Chemicals used in fracking include, potentially at
least, benzene, toluene, boric acid, xylene, diesel fuel,
methanol, formaldehyde, and ammonium bisul-
fate.10,12 It should be noted that, in deference to any
proprietary interests, drillers are not required to
report or make public the chemicals they use. The
potential for the contamination of groundwater from
these chemicals exists primarily due the possibility of
leaks through cement well casings. Most of the fluid
remaining in the ground is lower (ie, 5,000-8,000 ft
beneath the surface) than groundwater aquifers that
are generally not more than 1,000 ft below the surface.
However, the potential for cracks in cement well cas-
ings and the escape of chemicals or methane gas dur-
ing the process of insertion and extraction is real. This
could pose a threat to groundwater aquifers. In addi-
tion to the fracking chemicals or fluids, the impact of
potential methane gas leaks (potential for explosion
and asphyxiation) is a very important concern with
respect to ground wells in rural areas. Finally, the
potential for errors in waste disposal and improper
treatment of the retrieved wastewater are among the
other major concerns associated with the relatively
unregulated acceleration of horizontal fracking.13,14
Energy producers are quick to deny that any of
the risks associated with fracking represent signifi-
cant concerns. They reassure us, as a matter of routine
but often without the rigorous science to back up their
reassurance, that all risks are minimal and manage-
able. This is to be expected. The energy industry has a
long history of developing new technologies that
expand risks as it identifies the potential for greater
profits. Companies often embrace risk believing they
can either manage it or safely roll the dice as they
seek to expand their market presence and reap the
gains to be had by being aggressive. Their success at
avoiding regulation in risk-taking adventures is often
aided in circumstances where the negative impacts
may take 30-40 years to be felt. Being aggressive, in
particular, is not necessarily a bad thing. However,
being reckless with respect to risk assessment and
risk management is always a bad thing.
Energy producers are understandably quick to
embrace new technologies for production. They are also
often unacceptably slow to assess and manage the
risks associated with them.15 Ideally, risk assessment
leads to risk management (ie, mitigation) and perhaps
even necessary governmental regulation for public
health and safety. However, safety is costly and,
together with regulations, may reduce profits. Energy
producers are more inclined to cut costs, including
safety related costs, to maximize profits than they are
to assess and manage risks. For example, this has been
a common practice in the oil industry.15-17 This has led
to more than a few disasters that could have been
avoided. Energy is an industry where failures in risk
management stand out and catastrophes abound. For
example, the BP Gulf disaster of 2010 took place in the
midst of contentious and unresolved debates over the
safety and environmental impact of deep water
drilling. It also highlighted BP’s history of routinely
failing to invest in safety as a means of cost cutting and
the lack of significant governmental oversight of deep
water drilling.15
Like most organized interests and all corporations,
energy producers work hard to influence the policy
process. They spend great amounts of money to avoid
governmental regulation and to, in effect, bury risks
associated with their work. For example, corporations
and fossil fuel interests have used a handful of dissi-
dent scientists to cast doubt on the likelihood of
adverse impacts arising from global climate change.
These scientists who oppose the scientific consensus
about global climate change have been funded prima-
rily by the fossil-fuel industry to create the illusion of
uncertainty.18 This support of “experts” who promote
research outcomes desired and paid for by the industry
is intelligently combined with sophisticated political
and public relations campaigns designed to reduce the
visibility of risks and, thus, the likelihood of govern-
mental regulation. Corporate financing and use of
front groups (ie, corporate-generated grass roots
responses) provide a cover of community concern for
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corporate interests. These front groups also give
elected officials the appearance of responding to voters
rather than voting for (or being the tool of) corporate
interests.18,19 These practices have been common and
ever more effective over the past two decades. Whether
restoring the image of an industry, promoting its inter-
ests in avoiding governmental regulation, or weaken-
ing public awareness of environmental threats posed
by their activity, corporations spend immense
resources to shape public opinion and influence public
policy makers.18,20
Millions of dollars are being spent by energy
groups (including the American Petroleum Institute)
to promote hydraulic fracturing. The goal is to influ-
ence the political process with respect to policies that
impact the industry and to minimize governmental
regulations.21 Building on the accepted and popular
notions that natural gas is the cleanest of the fossil
fuels, abundant enough to provide for America’s
energy needs for the next 60 years, safe to process, and
thus a logical fuel source to pursue American energy
independence, the ad campaigns and lobbying efforts
of energy interests emphasize the potential of natural
gas in promoting the goal of American energy inde-
pendence (ie, a real-world solution to our energy
needs). They also stress the theme that policies favor-
able to them will strengthen the economy and protect
our national security.21 For example, most of the tele-
vision advertising of the American Petroleum
Institute is not about promoting consumerism but is
about creating an impression (ie, it is political). All of
this is everyday politics and business as usual.
Trying to change or influence the way the public
and politicians think, a legitimate practice to be sure,
may include as a matter of unfortunate routine corpo-
rate efforts to weaken public awareness of environ-
mental threats or public health risks. Indeed, corpo-
rate responses to scientific research that point out
these threats or risks often include millions of dollars
spent for cover-ups, deceptions, data manipulation,
fraudulent claims, and fake studies.18 One might sug-
gest this is why it is of critical importance that govern-
ments play a proactive role in monitoring and regulat-
ing public health and safety. However, governments
under the influence of corporate lobbying and public
relations campaigns are often reluctant or tardy with
respect to meeting this responsibility.
The 2005 Energy Policy Act passed by Congress
(crafted by Vice President Cheney who once ran
Halliburton, one of the companies that pioneered
fracking) exempted hydraulic fracturing (fracking)
from meeting the requirements of the Clean Air Act,
the Safe Drinking Water Act, and the Clean Water
Act.10 This was preceded by a 2004 determination
(that was neither comprehensive nor scientifically
rigorous) by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) which concluded that the extraction of natural
gas via horizontal fracking posed little to no threat to
drinking water or public health. This study was
denounced by at least one EPA whistleblower for its
poor science and as having been the product of an
industry-influenced review panel.22 In 2010, the EPA
reversed this earlier stance and announced it would
launch a $1.9 million research program to assess pub-
lic health risks associated with fracking.
Currently, there are one million fracking wells
operating in the United States. The natural gas indus-
try claims that this drilling has not caused a single
case of groundwater contamination. This is not true
according to the Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Protection, which has documented the
contamination of an aquifer that fills household wells
in a rural area where more than 60 wells were drilled
in a 9-mile2 area.10 There are other such reports from
Pennsylvania to Colorado of possible groundwater
contamination.22 Recent studies from New York assert
that improperly treated fracking wastewater (contain-
ing radioactive materials and harmful chemicals) is
finding its way into the state’s bodies of water.23
As the EPA conducts its long overdue study (after
abandoning its incomplete 2004 assessment) and pub-
lic policy makers slowly begin to react to growing con-
cerns, one might well wonder if drilling in areas where
water supplies might be impacted is a good idea. Given
some recent research findings, and a growing public
concern, policy makers will at least be compelled to
seriously engage in the assessment and management
of risks. As both scientific inquiry and public aware-
ness expand, new policy challenges are emerging on
the public agenda. It would appear that an important
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and an inevitable corner has been turned in the policy
process and that risk assessment and risk manage-
ment are about to be elevated on the policy agenda.
POTENTIAL RISKS AND NEW STUDIES
In December 2010, the nonprofit Civil Society
Institute issued a report on a national fracking survey
it had commissioned. This was presented as the first
national poll conducted to gauge the attitude of
American citizens on the subject of fracking. Sixty-
nine percent were concerned about the possible threat
to safe drinking water posed by horizontal fracking.
Seventy-eight percent said they would support
requirements for drillers to publicly disclose the chem-
icals used in the fracking process (something they are
not presently required to do) and agreed that more
study into the health and environmental impacts of
fracking was needed. More than half (56 percent) said
they think the federal government is not doing enough
to require disclosure of the chemicals used, and nearly
three out of five polled said they would vote to protect
public health and the environment over energy pro-
duction where the two may be in conflict.24 Poll results
such as these will no doubt influence policymakers to
pivot toward a greater concern for risk assessment
and risk management. Just as important, if not more,
the results of some new scientific studies that call into
question the assurances and assumptions of the natu-
ral gas industry and its supporters may also begin to
expand the policy discussion.
An important study concerning the methane con-
tamination of drinking water in conjunction with
hydraulic fracturing was published in the spring of
2011.25 The researchers identified the specific fracking
concerns related to drinking water (ie, toxicity of pro-
duced water from fracturing fluids that may be dis-
charged into the environment, fluid and gas flow and
discharge into shallow aquifers, the impact on private
wells that rely on shallow groundwater for drinking
and agricultural use, and the potential for explosion)
and proceeded to conduct tests in Pennsylvania of
drinking water wells in the proximity of fracking activ-
ity. Sixty wells were tested and methane concentra-
tions were found in 51 (85 percent) of them. The aver-
age methane concentration in shallow groundwater in
active drilling areas was 17 times higher and exceeded
the level identified for urgent hazard mitigation by the
US Office of the Interior. In this study, there was no
evidence of contamination of drinking water by frack-
ing chemicals or fluids. However, the correlation of
drilling and high methane levels was considered a
cause for heightened concern.25
The authors of the Pennsylvania methane contam-
ination study recommended the long-term monitoring
of the industry and private homeowners. They urged
drilling firms to comply with a recent request by the
EPA to voluntarily report the constituents of fracking
fluids. Most importantly, they called for systematic and
independent data collection on groundwater quality
before drilling begins in any region and stressed the
need for greater stewardship, more knowledge, and
regulation to ensure the sustainable future of shale gas
extraction.25
In an interesting aside to the methane contami-
nation study, residents in Pennsylvania reported that
their water wells had exploded or could be lit on fire.
The drilling industry and its supporters described
these cases as anecdotal. They also said the findings
of the study were unconnected to drilling activity.
Clearly, and despite this industry response, it would
at a minimum be wise to continue investigating such
widespread cases of methane contamination.
Another new study released in the spring of 2011
called into question the notion of natural gas as the
cleaner energy alternative. It also cast significant
doubts on its benefits in combating global climate
change.26 The authors of this study concluded that the
greenhouse gas footprint of natural gas is actually
greater than that of conventional gas and oil or coal.
They demonstrated that when you look at the footprint
of shale over a longer time span and include in that
time span the assessment of waste, leaks, production
technology, and consumption, etc, a natural gas well
will, over the course of its lifetime, contribute more
greenhouse gas emissions than previously thought. In
fact, the overall carbon footprint of shale gas will be 20
percent greater than that of coal according to their
analysis.26 Other recent studies have also suggested
that methane has greater global warming potential
than previously assumed thus challenging the notion
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of natural gas as the cleaner energy alternative or a
bridge fuel to a cleaner energy future in the battle
against climate change.27-29 The natural gas industry
has questioned the accuracy of all of these studies. In
fact, on the release of any new research on the risks or
negative environmental impacts associated with frack-
ing, the industry is quick to question the legitimacy of
the conclusions or the methods of analysis and to reaf-
firm the safety of their drilling technology. However,
the questions raised are serious enough to demand fur-
ther study and rigorous scientific research.
As the much needed research into the risks asso-
ciated with hydraulic fracturing continues, it is wise to
remember that neither the industry nor its critics
have enough knowledge to provide the answers we
need. It would certainly be premature to abandon nat-
ural gas as a viable energy option or horizontal frac-
turing as a means of natural gas extraction. However,
it would also be premature and utterly irresponsible
to proceed as though the industry’s belief that its prac-
tices and technology are perfectly safe is an uncon-
testable truth. The research is incomplete to be sure,
but enough has been done to recommend caution. The
need for risk assessment and the identification of risk
management techniques are clearly required as an
urgent necessity.
The concerns related to public health and safety
with respect to fracking risks cannot be left in the
hands of the energy producers and their supporters
alone. Their first priority is clearly and understand-
ably their own economic self-interest. That is business
(and politics) as usual. Safety and public health are
concerns that require an active governmental role and
the application of the best scientific research. What is
required is the performance of risk assessment as a
public function and the promotion of risk management
as a policy priority. As we turn our attention to a dis-
cussion that need and assess the inevitable pivoting of
the hydraulic fracturing policy conversation in that
direction, we must also ask whether policy makers
might need to be more efficient with respect to the
general meeting of their presumed responsibility for
public health and safety. With respect to hydraulic
fracturing and natural gas extraction, as well as with
most technical advances that may expand risks to
public health and safety, the more efficient and effec-
tive application of risk assessment and risk manage-
ment techniques must become a prerequisite for poli-
cymaking and a foundation for identifying and
establishing any needed regulatory requirements.
PIVOTING TOWARD RISK MANAGEMENT
As we have seen, risk assessment and risk man-
agement are not always a first priority for corpora-
tions and policy makers. They are just as often not
priorities for the public they serve either. The interest
of the public and public policymakers in risk reduc-
tion is in fact much lower than one might wish to
think. This is especially true when the risk being dis-
cussed is a statistical probability not yet known
through experience. When a disaster is unfolding, or
when it has been experienced for the first time, atten-
tion to risk reduction and mitigation generally
increases.30 However, even in those situations where
the public and policy interest has peaked, usually in
the aftermath of a catastrophe that may be expected
to occur again, planning and timely action for risk
reduction must be accomplished before public and
political interest inevitably begins to wane. This can
be especially troubling with respect to technological
disasters associated with scientific and industrial
advances. The risks they impose are new, often take
decades to reveal themselves through adverse
impacts on humanity and society, and are easy to
ignore until a worst case scenario is on us.31
Risk is best thought of as something that can be
measured in terms of the potential loss or decrease of
valued assets (life, health, property, income, etc). Often
we forget that the very things we do that may consti-
tute a benefit (eg, the eradication of insects and pests)
carry inevitable risks or potential losses (eg, the poi-
soning of crops or people) with them.31 The conven-
tional wisdom is with risk assessment and with subse-
quent measures to manage risk (ie, mitigation), the
probability for hazards that will place humanity at
great peril should decline. However, the political and
social reality is that managing risk is subject to social,
economic, and political relations that often obscure
our focus and embed the process of risk assessment in
ideological clashes and conflicts of interest.32 This
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frustrates risk management in significant ways and
works against risk reduction as a public policy prior-
ity. Even with respect to commonly occurring natural
disasters, the United States has not always excelled at
risk assessment and risk management. One need to
think only of Hurricane Katrina to perceive the cost of
such failure.33 The challenge is even more daunting
with respect to technological and industrial risks.
The impact of delays or lags in risk assessment and
risk management is only enhanced by early policy initia-
tives that are initiated without rigorous scientific analy-
sis. The 2004 EPA pronouncement and the 2005 Energy
Policy Act, both of which we might say prematurely and
rather unscientifically downplayed any risks posed by
hydraulic fracturing, led to the exempting of fracking
from federal environmental regulation. This not only
weakened the federal role in promoting safety and risk
reduction with respect to unconventional natural gas
exploration, it also delayed (for nearly a decade) any sus-
tained efforts at risk assessment and risk management.
Supporters of these measures would say that it was left
up to the states to perform this function.The natural gas
industry thinks that states are doing more than an ade-
quate job of protecting the public.34
The 2005 Energy Policy Act in essence created a
policy void removing the EPA as a monitor on the
boom in gas fracking. This void was not, as the natu-
ral gas industry suggests, adequately filled by the
states. State efforts vary greatly and, in most cases,
are heavily influenced by the industry. Some states,
Colorado for example, are said to provide reasonable
protection for their residents from groundwater con-
tamination. The state of New York, after discovering
untreated fracking wastewater in its bodies of water,
suspended fracking in the Marcellus Shale as it set
about to create new protection rules.35 However, most
states, especially those new to the fracking revolution,
have few if any safeguards. It is interesting to note
that as the fracking revolution has spread and the
risks associated with the technology have become a
matter for wider public concern and discussion, some
states and the federal government are just beginning
to do what should have been done long ago. They are
getting serious about risk assessment and risk man-
agement. The policy void may soon be filled.
The EPA’s decision in 2010 to reconsider its 2004
assessment and launch an intensive study to learn
whether the technology associated with the fracking
boom in natural gas production is a threat to drinking
water and to public health is an important first step on
the path to responsibility. However, both the EPA and
the Congress should have taken this step at the very
beginning of the boom. Having taken this step now
does signal the beginning, however belatedly, of a nec-
essary process for risk assessment. As the EPA com-
pletes its study over the next several years, it should
also determine if the urgency of the concerns that have
led to this decision to study might require some regu-
lation of hydraulic fracturing even before the assess-
ment is completed. Several options are obvious.
The EPA could delay any regulatory recommenda-
tions or decisions about hydraulic fracturing until its
study is completed. This would leave the question of
regulation up to the states, as is currently the case, and
allow the status quo to prevail. As a second option, the
EPA could place a moratorium on all fracking opera-
tions until its study is completed and new federal reg-
ulations are developed. A third option would be to
begin, based on evidence already available in existing
studies and the concerns expressed or being addressed
at the state level, to regulate hydraulic fracturing
immediately in a manner that balances the need to
protect public health and safety with the benefits
gained from hydraulic fracturing. This third option has
gained considerable support in the US Congress.
An effort to legislate and address the concerns
associated with hydraulic fracturing was finally initi-
ated in Congress in 2009, almost a full decade into the
fracking boom. Those efforts failed but were renewed
in 2011 with the reintroduction of the “Fracturing
Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act”
(FRAC Act).36 The Senate version of this bill would
close the oversight gap that the natural gas industry
has benefited from since the passage of the 2005
Energy Policy Act. It would repeal the provision of the
2005 Act that exempted the industry from complying
with the Safe Drinking Water Act. The bill would also
require the public disclosure of chemicals used by the
natural gas industry in its fracking operations
although they would not be required to reveal specific
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formulas where there is a proprietary interest.
However, there is an emergency provision that would
require that proprietary chemical formulas be released
to attending physicians, the state, and the EPA where
the information is needed for treatment in emergency
situations.36
The FRAC Act died in committee in 2009. Its rein-
troduction in 2011 may not lead to passage either. The
natural gas industry is lobbying aggressively against
this legislation as a part of its overall agenda to limit
federal oversight of gas drilling. Congress itself
remains far from united in perceiving the need to act.
It is clear that the process of risk assessment and risk
management will most likely continue to be pursued
in the American policy process in an overtly partisan
manner and, as such, it is far from efficient in serving
the public interest in safety and health. A responsible
approach to risk assessment and risk management is
perhaps compromised to the degree it is dependent on
the vagaries of partisan politics and economic self-
interest. However, the potential for responsible action
exists nonetheless as both the public interest and the
new documentation of risks are beginning to place
new demands before policymakers.
Just as the policymaking process (and the politics
that influences it) may promote a lag between new
technologies and the analysis of risks they may
impose, the inevitable impact of those risks soon
becomes an impetus to bring the policy process back to
dealing with them. This inevitable pivoting of the pol-
icy agenda, a response to the growing perception of or
experience with the risks posed by a new technology,
opens up new possibilities that the policy process will
in turn investigate. Not only policymakers but also
some natural gas producers have expressed a willing-
ness to cooperate in determining the effects of
hydraulic fracturing and establishing appropriate safe
guards.37 In a policy environment where risk assess-
ment and risk management were first and nonparti-
san priorities, this willingness could be tested and so
much more efficiently capitalized on to promote indus-
try cooperation in the thorough and credible analysis
of the impacts that a surge in natural gas production
may have on air, water, and landscapes. It could lead
to expanded industry efforts to reduce methane
releases during the production and distribution of nat-
ural gas, the establishment and regulatory enforce-
ment of best practices, and the public disclosure of
toxic chemicals used in natural gas production.
As the policy discussion pivots to focus more on
risk assessment and risk management, the challenge
will be to create policies and regulations that are
grounded in scientific understanding and to achieve
effective communication of fact-based assessments of
environmental impacts. More science must be injected
into the fracking conversation so policymakers will
have the foundation they need for responsible action.
As this redirecting or pivoting of the hydraulic fractur-
ing discussion begins, it may also be useful to use the
occasion of this reorientation to broaden the discus-
sion to include ways of addressing the need for general
improvement in the public functions of risk assess-
ment and risk management with respect to new tech-
nologies.
CONCLUSIONS: A PATH TO RESPONSIBILITY
As this analysis is concluded, it can be said that
there is much room for improvement in the use of the
techniques of risk assessment and risk management in
the public policy process as it relates to hydraulic frac-
turing or any other new technology that may bring
with it new risks to public health and safety. The tech-
niques for risk assessment and risk management are
well known and used in the field of emergency man-
agement generally, but there is a dearth of considera-
tion of such techniques in the public policy making
process until such time as negative impacts or crisis
events force risk assessment and risk management
onto the public agenda. At that juncture, the policy dis-
cussion inevitably shifts to risk analysis. Such a shift
seems now to be in motion with respect to the impact
of hydraulic fracturing. As such, it may be a good case
to use to invigorate the national discussion of risk
assessment and risk management as a public function
and to elevate it as a priority in the policy process.
As we have previously noted, the benefits derived
from new technologies are frequently (ie, almost
always) accompanied by new risks. The policy process,
influenced by the ideological clashes and conflicts of
interest that shape it, rarely elevates risk to the level of
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first priority. Such attention that risk does receive tends
to be reactive as opposed to proactive. This can result in
tragic and perhaps even deadly delays in the meeting of
any responsibility for public health and safety.
As our case study suggests, private decision mak-
ers are generally and understandably more inclined to
the pursuit and promotion of self-interests as opposed
to the public well-being. This means that the ultimate
responsibility for public health and public safety
resides with public policy makers and public sector
agents. Yet in a policy-making process driven by the
influence of economic interests and political variables
that often move policy makers to act before they study
risks, that is, before they have the capacity to make
knowledge-based judgments, one is tempted to sug-
gest that the responsibility for public health and
safety is doomed to be unmet until a disaster strikes.
In an ideal world, public decision makers and pri-
vate actors alike would routinely examine each new
technology and the benefits it promises in the context
of the inevitable new threats and risks they may
impose. Remembering that every benefit involves a
potential cost or risk, and that with respect to hydraulic
fracturing or any number of other technological
advances, we are often talking about costs that impinge
on public health, it would be desirable to see risk
assessment and risk management integrated much
earlier and more routinely into the process of public
and private decision making. This would entail both an
upfront and ongoing threat assessment determining
the credibility and nonrandomness of threats, vulnera-
bility assessments, measures of expected impacts and
losses, and the integration of this information into a
cost-benefit matrix of sorts that would inform the
development of policies to reduce risks to tolerable lev-
els and eliminate some of the perils that invite hazards
which may escalate losses.
At a minimum, in an effort to propel risk assess-
ment and risk management to a place of first priority
in the policy process as it relates to new technologies
that carry potential risks with them, three general
principles should be elevated above all other competing
and valid concerns or interests. First, the policy discus-
sion must be infused from the very beginning with the
appropriate and necessary scientific analysis. The
development of the necessary foundation for knowl-
edge-based decision making must be of greater priority
and should never be short changed in the more imme-
diate service of any other political, ideological, or eco-
nomic interest. Second, as the science is infused, it
must be directed to a comprehensive risk assessment
as a prerequisite for any long-term policy development.
Third, the implementation of new technological meth-
ods proven to be associated with new risks to public
health and safety should be subject to reasonable and
scientifically based requirements for mitigation plan-
ning or risk management. These, where appropriate,
should inform any eventual regulatory structure.
The application of these three principles to the
hydraulic fracturing policy discussion (ie, at the very
beginning of the process) would have looked very
much like, frankly, what appears to be happening now
some 10 years into the boom. The EPA research pro-
gram to assess environmental and public health risks
associated with fracking would have been pursued as
a necessary first step in the policy process and com-
pleted years earlier. The exemption of natural gas
producers from federal regulation (ie, the Safe
Drinking Water Act, the Clean Air Act, and the Clean
Water Act) would not have been enacted before the
scientific study required to inform policy. The void
created by removing the EPA as a monitor on the
boom in gas fracking, a boom that has cut across state
lines into almost every region of the country with the
potential to impact public health and safety across
the nation, would not have been allowed to exist. The
concerns related to drinking water, the toxicity of
fracking chemicals, the impact on shallow aquifers,
the correlation of drilling and high methane levels in
groundwater used for drinking, etc all would have
been much more thoroughly explored and much ear-
lier. Responsible interim legislation, perhaps some-
thing like the presently proposed FRAC Act, would
have been enacted years earlier. By now, some 10
years into the fracking boom, the foundation for
knowledge-based decision making would have led to
the establishment of sensible federal and state regu-
lations protecting public health and safety and ensur-
ing, no doubt, the sustainable future of shale gas
extraction.
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There is no doubt that economic and technological
advancement requires risks to be taken. There is also
no question that the industries taking those risks and
the public policy makers who monitor and potentially
regulate them are interested in a variety of valid and
competing economic and political objectives. However,
given that major and complex technological advances
carry the potential for inflicting greater and unac-
ceptable risks with them, it follows that risk assess-
ment and risk management should be a higher prior-
ity for public policy makers. This is neither to
disregard partisan divisions and ideological conflict
over the concept of governmental regulation nor to
forget that corporate resistance to regulation may
successfully drive much of the political process. This
is not to say that the function of governmental regu-
lation, whatever its basis, is without its imperfec-
tions. It is simply to say that the discussion of risk
assessment and the public policy promotion of risk
management must be a first priority as opposed to an
inevitable agenda item some years after the negative
impacts or threats of a more or less unregulated new
technology are already and often tragically on us.
It may be more than a bit idealistic to suggest that
the public policy process can be anything more than reac-
tive with respect to the assessment and management of
risks associated with new technologies. However, given
the potential for severe and negative public health and
safety impacts, not to mention the great costs these may
impose when they are fully on us, it is reasonable to pro-
mote a more proactive approach. It may be reasonable to
place the same expectations on our policy makers that
are placed on emergency management professionals
with respect to making risk assessment and risk man-
agement an expected first step.As the belated analysis of
risk with respect to hydraulic fracturing gains momen-
tum, it might serve as an impetus to explore new mech-
anisms for elevating risk assessment and management
as a priority in the policy process and to eliminate the
delay or lag that postpones the inevitable at the expense
of public health and safety. That is the needed first step
on the path to responsibility.
Robert O. Schneider, PhD, Department of Public Administration,
University of North Carolina at Pembroke, Pembroke, North Carolina.
REFERENCES
1. Botkin DB: Powering the Future. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Person
Education, 2010.
2. Wolensky RP, Wolensky KC: Local government’s problems with
disaster management: A literature review and structural analysis.
Policy Stud Rev. 1990; 8: 703-725.
3. Wright JD, Rossi PH: Social Sciences and Natural hazards.
Cambridge: ABT Books, 1981.
4. Kreps GA: Organizing for emergency management. In Drabek
TE, Hoetmer GJ (eds.): Emergency Management Principles and
Practices for Local Governments. Washington, DC: International
City Managers Association, 1991: 30-54.
5. Grant NK: Emergency management training and education for
public administrators. In Sylves RT, Waugh WL (eds.): Disaster
Management in the U.S. and Canada. Springfield, IL: Charles C.
Thomas, 1996: 313-325.
6. Sylves RT: Redesigning and administering federal emergency man-
agement. In Sylves RT, Waugh WL (eds.): Disaster Management in the
U.S. and Canada. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1996: 5-25.
7. Schneider RO: An overview of the new emergency management.
J Emer Manag. 2004; 2(1): 25-29.
8. Kirby A: Nothing to Fear: Risks and Hazards in American
Society. Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 1990.
9. Leung M, Lambert JH, Mosenthal A: A risk-based approach to
setting priorities in protecting bridges against terrorist attacks.
Risk Anal. 2004; 24(4): 963-984.
10. Katusa M: The Fracking Controversy. Financial Sense. Available
at http://www.investorsinsight.com/blogs/casey_research/archive/2011/
05/19/the-fracking-controversy.aspx. Accessed December 5, 2011.
11. Maugeri L: Beyond the Age of Oil. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger,
2010.
12. Earth Works Station: Hydraulic Fracturing 101. Available at
http://www.earthworksaction.org/issues/detail/hydraulic_fracturing_
101. Accessed December 5, 2011.
13. Zoback M, Kitasei S, Copithorne B: Addressing the environmen-
tal risks from shale gas development. Paper presented at the
Worldwatch Institute Briefing Paper 1, Worldwatch Institute,
Bucknell University, Washington, DC, July 1010. Available at
http://blogs.worldwatch.org/revolt/wp-content/uploads/2010/
07/Environmental-Risks-Paper-July-2010-FOR-PRINT.pdf.
Accessed August 1, 2011.
14. Revesz KM, Breen KJ, Baldassare AJ, et al.: Carbon and hydro-
gen isotopic evidence for the origin of combustible gasses in water
supply wells in north-central Pennsylvania. Appl Geochem. 2010;
25: 1845-1859.
15. Schneider RO: Ethics and oil: Preventing the next disaster.
J Emer Manag. 2011; 9(8): 11-22.
16. Hanson K: Safety, corporate responsibility, and the oil spill.
Available at http://www.scu.edu/ethics/practicing/focusareas/
business/bp.html. Accessed December 5, 2011.
17. Ott R: Sound Truth and Corporate Myth: The Legacy of the
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill. Cordova, AK: Dragonfly Sisters Press, 2005.
18. Beder S: Global Spin. Glasgow, UK: Green Books, 2002.
19. Merrill R: Activism in the 90’s: Changing rules for public rela-
tions. Public Relat Q. 1991; 36(3): 28-32.
20. Lindheim J: Restoring the image of the chemical industry.
Chem Ind. 1989; 15: 491-494.
21. Sustainablebusiness.com: Fracking lobby outspends environ-
mental groups 4-1. Available at http://www.sustainablebusiness.
com/index.cfm/go/news.display/id/22232. Accessed May 25, 2011.
22. Bruzelius N: EPA turnaround: Collecting data on fracking risks
just might be a good idea. Available at http://www.ewg.org/kid-
safe-chemicals-act-blog/2010/03/epa-turnaround-collecting-data-
Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 10, No. 4, July/August 2012
275
on-fracking-risks-just-might-be-a-good-idea/. Accessed May 25,
2011.
23. Skrapits E: Environmental watchdog outlines fracking risk.
Citizensvoice.com. Available at http://citizensvoice.com/news/
drilling/environmental-watchdog-outlines-fracking-risks-1.1115694#
axzz1fgxmf9wc. Accessed December 5, 2011.
24. Civil Society Institute: Drinking water pollution concerns fuel-
ing awareness among Americans of fracking used to extract natu-
ral gas. Available at http://www.civilsocietyinstitute.org/media.
a122110release.cfm. Accessed June 8, 2011.
25. Osborn SG, Vengosh A, Warner RW, et al.: Methane contamina-
tion of drinking water accompanying gas-well drilling and
hydraulic fracturing. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2011;108(20):8172-
8176.
26. Howarth RW, Santoro R, Ingraffea A: Methane and the green-
house-gas footprint of natural gas from shale formations. Clim
Change. 2011; 106: 679-690.
27. Shindell DT, Faluvegi G, Koch DM, et al.: Improved attribution
of climate forcing to emissions. Science. 2009; 326: 716-718.
28. Shires TM, Loughran CJ, Jones S, et al.: Compendium of
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Methodologies for the Oil and Natural
Gas Industry. Prepared by URS Corporation for the American
Petroleum Institute. Washington, DC: API, 2009.
29. Jamarillo P, Griffin WM, Mathews HS: Comparative life-
cycle air emissions of coal, domestic natural gas, LNG, and SNG
for electricity generation. Environ Sci Technol. 2007; 41: 6290-
6296.
30. Alexander D: Principles of Emergency Planning and
Management. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press,
2002.
31. Gallant BJ: Essentials in Emergency Management. Langham,
MD: Scarecrow Press Inc., 2008.
32. Clarke L: Mission Improbable: Using Fantasy Documents to
Tame Disaster. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999.
33. Clay EJ: Katrina: A third world catastrophe? In Richardson
HW, Gordon P, Moore JE (eds.): Natural Disaster Analysis After
Katrina. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2008.
34. Energyindepth.org: Hydraulic Fracturing, SDWA, Fluids, and
DeGette/Casey. Available at http://www.energyindepth.org/wp
content/uploads/2009/03/faq_hf_sdwa_fluids_degettecasey.pdf.
Accessed June 21, 2011.
35. Climate Progress: Getting to the bottom of natural gas fracking.
Available at http://thinkprogress.org/romm/2010/03/03/205585/
natural-gas-fracking/. Accessed December 5, 2011.
36. S. 1215: Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals
(FRAC) Act. Available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.
xpd?bills111-1215. Accessed June 28, 2011.
37. Chesapeake Energy: Commitment to environmental excellence.
Available at http://www.chk.com/Environment/Commitment/
Pages/information.aspx. Accessed August 3, 2011.
Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 10, No. 4, July/August 2012
276
